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11 JUN 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: [REDACTED]

Director of Security

SUBJECT:

Leaks [REDACTED]

REFERENCE:

Memorandum for Chairman/SECOM from DCI,
dated 8 June 1984, same subject

1. Paragraph 2 of reference directs that you render a report as to the status of investigation of possible leaks in CIA including the use of the polygraph. The following paragraphs detail information relative to this Agency's investigation of leaks that may be pertinent to the formulation of your report.

2. During the period 1978 to present, a total of six Agency employees were identified as having made unauthorized disclosures to members of the news media. In three cases the information was initially developed through polygraph examinations. Two of the individuals identified resigned, one retiree was disapproved for rehire as a contract annuitant, one individual was allowed to retire but was reduced one grade on retirement, one individual was given five days leave without pay and departed the Agency shortly thereafter, and one individual was delayed in converting from contract to staff status until it was determined that his participation was secondary to the primary culpable individual. The latter individual was an employee of another agency when the leak occurred.

3. Questions concerning unauthorized disclosure of classified information are an integral part of both the entry on duty and reinvestigation polygraph examinations. Part of the reinvestigation polygraph examination is specifically designed to determine if an individual has provided classified information to the media. Through our security education program, each employee is indoctrinated relative to his or her responsibility to protect classified information. From the time he or she enters on duty with this Agency, each individual is made aware that the reinvestigation process, including polygraph examination, is in part, to determine if the individual has provided classified information to an unauthorized person. This awareness is a significant deterrent factor enjoyed by this Agency over those agencies that do not have a polygraph program.

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4. Due to the consistently wide dissemination of information determined to have been leaked, it is a rare occurrence when the number of suspects in a leak investigation can be narrowed to a small enough number for polygraphing to be considered as a prudent course of action. In 1983 only one case resulted in polygraphing and was in conjunction with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation of a leak. In 1984 to date only in one case, which is current and ongoing, is polygraphing planned. However, in 1982 two of the individuals cited in paragraph 2 were detected in routine pre-entry on duty polygraph examinations. This serves to point out the spinoff effect of the Agency's polygraph program as a detector of and deterrent to leakers. []

5. Since January 1983 the Office of Security has processed over 182 media articles containing purported and perceived passages that were initially thought to be based on classified information which originated within the CIA. Each article was evaluated to authenticate that classified CIA intelligence had been compromised. This culling process resulted in determining that 74 cases or 40.6 percent of all cases evaluated contained leaked CIA classified information. These cases were internally investigated by the Office of Security and reported to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. []

6. Fifty reporters working for 25 different media outlets have been responsible for these stories. Eighty percent of all leak stories have come from five major media outlets:

Media Outlet

Number of Articles/Reports

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The remaining media outlets (20) have averaged 1.5 leak articles during the past 18-month period. []

7. Forty-nine percent of all leak articles for the same period come from 10 reporters:


Reporters

Number of Reports

[]	
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12. Lead information suggests that some of these leaks may have originated from Congressional committees which received briefings from CIA officials. The articles detected in 1983 resulted in leads that the origin of the disclosures was in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). The 1984 articles have leads pointing toward the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). Although there has been a clear transformation of firsthand lead information from 1983 to 1984, records reflect that HPSCI has received the same briefings as the SSCI prior to each media report. The Office of Security reports have reflected unbiased factual reporting of events.

13. The FBI is currently investigating several of the 1983 disclosures. Personnel in the Directorate of Operations/Latin America Division have been interviewed and reportedly one congressman was recently interviewed. The 1984 cases on Central America have all been forwarded to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice recently responded to one article requesting that the CIA reconsider a referral in light of the fact that the Agency's involvement in the covert operation had been confirmed publicly by the administration. This Department of Justice response is disturbing. Each 1984 article disclosing classified CIA intelligence on Central America has reportedly been confirmed by one or more unidentified administration officials. This does not address the problem of the leak but establishes a precedence of inaction on cases referred which are politically sensitive. To date, there has not been a CIA response to the Department of Justice.

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14. The Office of Security has also obtained other investigative leads and patterns of disclosure on other reporters:



15. Other cases have been investigated and the results forwarded to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Department of Justice. Offhand, no other clear-cut patterns come to mind. If you need more information, please let me know.

